ASLS21 is supported by moderators from the following organizations:

In support of U.S. Northern Command’s Arctic Security and Defense Mission

Alaskan Command hosts

Arctic Senior Leader Summit 2021 (ASLS21)

A Virtual Summit on Arctic Security and Defense

University of Alaska

11 March 2021
Introduction and overview.

In support of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Alaskan Command (ALCOM) (a subordinate unified command reporting to USNORTHCOM) is hosting a two-(partial) day Arctic Senior Leader Summit 2021 (ASLS21) via a virtual event on 10-11 March 2021.

ASLS21 Exercise Program (Day 2 of the Summit) will consist of a half-day tabletop exercise providing a smaller group of invited leaders with an opportunity to address decision-making encounters via plausible but fictitious crisis scenarios. The purpose of ASLS 21 Day 2 is to principally familiarize military leaders in the unique challenges of Arctic crisis response.

ASLS21 Day 2 is a planned three-move tabletop exercise conducted as scenario-based decision-making to inform senior leaders to challenges, constraints, and opportunities. Day 2 is oriented as a tabletop “invitation only” (a subset of the prior days’ participants)- exercise using methodologies similar to National Defense University and the U.S. Joint Staff. Via three varied scenarios of Arctic region security and defense challenges, the ASLS21 tabletop exercise will support senior military leader orientation and understanding of the complexities of assessing, characterizing, and responding to Arctic crises. Due to the integrated nature of Canada and U.S. Arctic oriented commands, that include active-duty service member exchange programs, ASLS21 Exercise program will include participation of Canadian military members.

A brief note about the Exercise participation.

Following the opening panel, ASLS21 Day two, will transition to a 3 move tabletop exercise. As described in the Annex, exercise planners have sequenced organizational units to organize respective views in response to the scenario. For each exercise move, exercise moderators will conduct “roll call fashion” to gain insight/perspective from each organization. For the sake of gaining insights, planners welcome “what I think we should do” from participants as opposed to simply an organizational response. As a respectful reminder, the intent of the exercise is to think and learn as a collective team.

Administrative details

Conference structure: Overall, ALCOM Arctic Senior Leader Summit 2021 is planned for 10-11 March 2021 using virtual conferencing.

Conference Medium. ASLS21 Exercise Conferencing is planned to be conducted via MS Teams. Zoom conferencing is a planned back-up if technical difficulties arise with MS Teams. Specific connection link to be provided via email to registered participants.

Event Hub: In order to support ASLS21 as a virtual activity, ASLS21 planners are providing an “Event Hub” to contain videos, documents and other resources useful to inform participants as
comprehensively as possible. Please see:
https://arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org/EventHub_ASLS21

Registration: ASLS 21 participants are requested to register (free) at the following link on the Arctic Domain Awareness Center (ADAC) website at the University of Alaska, (please note registration is adjacent to the below banner. Please see:
https://arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org/Events.

ASLS21 Tabletop Exercise information: ADAC’s approach to tabletop exercises is organized as an adaptation of three specific “wargaming” and exercise constructs used within the U.S. military. ASLS21 Tabletop exercises will be conducted by an exercise set of scene-setting videos designed to draw participants into specific activities to understand the problems and form crisis response (usually emerging events...not corresponding to a specific existing crisis response plans). These tabletop exercises are generally open to a wider audience, to include other Federal agencies, international guests, academia, think tanks, and industry. These are generally oriented to a “single team” construct. These tabletop exercises are governed by an exercise control cell who role-play outside agencies, opposing views, etc.

**ASLS21 Day 2, 11 March 2021**
AST: Alaska Standard Time (Eastern minus 4 hours)
MST: Mountain Standard Time (Eastern minus 2 hours)
EST: Eastern Standard Time

Note: Alaska Standard is 10 hours behind Central European Time (i.e., 0700 Alaska is 1700 Central Europe)

4 March 2021
0900 Alaska/1100 Mountain/1300 Eastern and 2000 Central European Time.

ASLS21 Exercise walk-through: We respectfully invite staff members supporting ASLS21 to consider joining an open session to walk through the exercise as an aide to prepare their principals on Thursday, 4 March 2021 from 0900 Alaska/1100 Mountain/1300 Eastern and 2000 Central European Time. We will use the associated links for ASLS21 Exercise as the connecting medium.

9 March 2021:
0800-0820 AST/1000-1020 MST/1200-1220 EST.
ASLS21 Exercise MS Teams Connectivity check for organizations unable to connect on 4 March 2021 Exercise walk-through.

11 March 2021
0700-0730 AST/0900-0930 MST/1100-1130 EST

Pre ASLS21 Communications check: ASLS21 Planning team will initiate Conference call 30 minutes in advance of the actual meeting start in order to support any person/office with connectivity challenges.

11 March 2021
0730-0740 AST/0930-0940 MST/1130-1140 EST

Welcome and administrative remarks: provided by ALCOM and ADAC ASLS21 planners.

0740-0750 AST/0940-0950 MST/1140-1150 EST

Commander ALCOM insights and expected outcomes for the ASLS practitioner’s panel and tabletop exercise.
0750-0900 AST/0950-1100 MST/1150-1300 EST

**ASLS21 Panel #6: A U.S. military service panel.** "Harnessing the power of exercises and training to advance better protect and preserve U.S. and allied/partner Strategic Interests.** A distinguished panel principally of flag and general officers, representing the U.S. military Services, responsible to organize, train and equip forces for DoD military activities or DHS Security missions across the circumpolar Arctic region. Panelists will consider describing (from current position), their view of challenges, concerns, needs, and opportunities that could better orient operations, exercises, and training activities to create sustaining effects of increased presence and posture in the Arctic.

**Moderator:** Randy “Church” Kee, ADAC, University of Alaska, Anchorage, AK

**Planned Panelists:**
- Lt Gen Samuel Clinton Hinote, USAF, HQ USAF, DCS Strategy, Integration and Requirements (AF/A5), Pentagon, Washington D.C. (Confirmed)
- VADM Phillip Sawyer, USN, OPNAV N3/5, Pentagon, Washington D.C. (Confirmed)
- VADM Scott Buschman, USCG, HQ USCG Deputy Commandant for Operations, Washington D.C. (Confirmed)
- MG Brad Gericke, USA, Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, HQ Department of the Army G3/5/7, Pentagon, Washington D.C. (Confirmed)
- Designated Representative, USSF, HQ USSF Chief Operations, Pentagon, Washington D.C. (Invited/Pending)

**Desired panel discussion:** Combatant commands and Service providers relay ways to orient operations, exercises, and training activities to create sustaining effects of increased presence and posture in the Arctic.

**Desired panel outcomes:** Convergence between combatant commands and Service providers to sustainably address Arctic activities, which better prepare and posture defense and security forces.

0900-0905 AST/1100-1105 MST/1300-1305 EST

**ASLS21 Exercise program introduction by exercise moderators.**

**Exercise moderators include:**
- Randy “Church” Kee, ADAC, University of Alaska, Anchorage, AK,
• Dr. Mike Sfraga, Director, Polar Institute Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington D.C., and
• Dr. Whitney Lackenbauer, Network Lead, North American and Arctic Defense and Security Network (NAADSN), Trent University, Ontario.

Exercise control group include Mr. Jason “Olaf” Roe (USCG ret), Ms. Ellee “Wizard” Matthews, and Mr. Conner “Conan” Keesecker, ADAC, UAA, Anchorage AK; Ms. Nicole Rumsey, USNORTHCOM J7, Peterson AFB CO; and oversight by Ms. Veronica Clark, ALCOM, JBER, AK.

0900-1000 AST/1100-1200 MST/1300-1400 EST

Tabletop Exercise Move 1: Search and rescue on the polar icepack.

Exercise Scenario: “SAR on the polar ice.”

A commercial 747 aircraft enroute from Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport to Frankfurt International Airport Germany experiences maintenance failure approximately 400 nautical miles northeast of Utqiagvik Alaska and conducts an emergency landing on the polar ice pack. Upon landing the aircraft breaks apart, with many serious injuries, but remarkably few deaths. While the ice around the aircraft appears solid, there are many open leads in the vicinity. An approaching polar storm is concerning. Time is of the essence to locate the aircraft and to save the survivors. Exercise participants should consider the potential for coordination with Russia and Canada as part of the response (which is in accordance with the Arctic Council’s Search and
Rescue agreement) and leverage what all of the Arctic nations through the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) have considered. For the exercise, suppose that a Russian icebreaker with helicopters on board could reach the crash site sooner than anyone else, how would such assistance be coordinated?

**Possible courses of action for overall response (as starting suggestions).**

- **COA 1:** Recommend to National Authorities to conduct emergency measures to rescue survivors on all possible speed as a U.S. military lead initiative. Review and activate/implement existing (Arctic suitable) large scale SAR plans from USCG, USNORTHCOM or other organizations. Request support from signature nations in accordance with Arctic Council Search and Rescue (SAR) Agreement

- **COA 2:** Recommend to National Authorities that due to risk of rescue with little to no assets nearby U.S. military is better postured to support another national led approach that may have more suitable assets much closer to effect a response.

**Range of needed decisions/actions (as starting suggestions).**

- Conducting reconnaissance of crash site
- Determine suitable/acceptable risk approach in rescue: Ice breaker with Helicopters, Submarine, Aircraft, other (such as a surface rescue)?
- If supporting another national led response, how best to communicate, coordinate, support?
- How best to coordinate/support response, if Russian or Chinese military is best suited to effect initial response.
- Request support from signature nations in accordance with Arctic Council Search and Rescue (SAR) Agreement.
- Establishing U.S. Federal Response and associated Command and Control, designated supported and supporting organizations.
- Activate supporting logistics for on-scene support.
- Airdrop of emergency supplies and pararescue to stabilize survivors.
- Effecting withdrawal of survivors to safe location to stabilize.
- Establishing nearest shoreside recovery site to stabilize survivors.
- Plans and implement movement of survivors from recovery site to onward definitive care.

1000-1010 AST/1200-1210 MST/1400-1410 EST

**Break**

1010-1120 AST/1210-1320 MST/1410-1520 EST
**Tabletop Exercise Move 2**: Defense support of civil authorities for a large-scale humanitarian assistance mission.

**Exercise Scenario**: “Arctic coast storm surge crisis.”

Utqiagvik and Browerville (combined population of approximately 5,500), and Wainwright (population of approx. 600) and smaller villages in between face significant damage as the result of a severe late fall storm with hurricane force winds, saturating rains, and a record-breaking coastal storm surge, which collapse water, power, and telecommunication systems and compromise sanitation systems, flooding food cellars and damaging homes, many to the point of creating unsafe living conditions. Right on the heels of the storm, a rapid cold front descends from the polar region, adding to humanitarian crisis. The size of the humanitarian crisis requires a large-scale response. Exercise participants should consider what is the overall DSCA requirement? Crisis action measures such as providing temporary housing/shelter, medical food, etc.? Air and sealift evacuation due to the severity of the damage? If the decision is to stabilize and recover on-site, what logistics support is needed and what sequence is needed to effect recovery?

**Possible courses of action for overall response (as starting suggestions):**

- **COA 1**: IAW National Response Framework, support a State of Alaska Led response, supported/led by National Guard appointed Dual Status Commander IAW Governor of Alaska and
North Slope Borough (NSB) Mayor coordination to implement associated emergency plans from NSB and State of Alaska Emergency Managers

- COA 2: Support alternative courses of action for response derived/agreed by National and State Authorities

Range of needed decisions/actions (as starting suggestions).

- Conducting reconnaissance of disaster site. Consider a gender analysis of affected community.  
- Implementing supporting plans and measures (logistics, supply, medical and more) as directed/coordinated by designated authorities. Ensuring responder gender diversity to meet needs of affected population.
- IAW supported authorities, determine the scope of response...what is needed and how urgent, and what are the priorities for the response? (divided by vulnerable population - consider collecting Sex and Age Disaggregated Data (SADD) - to prioritize the response?)
  - Characterize the response: Is principal driver to stabilize, clothe, feed and shelter to enable refurbish/rebuild or evacuate to an alternative location, or a combination?
  - Determine and implement temporary shelter logistics packages to support homeless. (With appropriate safeguards for displaced women and children). What is most immediate available and how suitable?
  - Determining health Implement medical response measures to support urgent and emergent health concerns.
  - Determine and responding to food needs for disaster victims (for example, did floods destroy food caches/underground storage?).
  - Determining if airlift of victims is needed and where to relocate?
  - Conducting airdrop of emergency supplies and pararescue to stabilize survivors if runway is unusable.
  - Coordinating and providing follow-on logistics to support response and recovery.

1120-1130 AST/1320-1330 MST/1520-1430 EST

Break

1130-1250 AST/1330-1450 MST/1530-1650 EST

Tabletop Exercise Move 3: Military maritime crisis action scenario involving a non-Arctic great power nation.

Exercise Scenario: "Security crisis in the NW Chukchi Sea."
**Exercise Scenario:** A non-Arctic nation with extensive Arctic interests and global ambitions establishes a persistent presence near the U.S. EEZ boundary approximately 200 NM northwest of Utqiagvik Alaska, arriving at their location in late summer. Several vessels presenting the same national flag are reported at this location, in which the respective national media is reporting as a “science expedition.” Imagery is obtained with one of the vessels displaying deck-mounted medium caliber weapons, and there are unverified reports the flotilla may be equipped with anti-ship missiles and ship-launched unmanned aerial vehicles.

Additional imagery suggests one or more of the vessels may either be fishing or collecting marine life and conducting scientific research, with the position of the vessels drifting into U.S. EEZ waters periodically by as much as several miles before relocating outside of the U.S. EEZ. The flotilla continues operating in a manner designed to disguise the true nature of their operations, and several vessels may be operating as either warships, government vessels, or as private research vessels. Some evidence...
suggests several vessels may be operating in support of a “mothership” that is maintaining a position just over 200NM from U.S. shoreline, with the smaller vessels illegally fishing/collecting marine life inside the US EEZ and then offloading their catch to the “mothership.”

An unarmed U.S. Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter, exercising in the Chukchi Sea as part of the USCG annual Arctic Shield exercise, proceeds to approach the flotilla to hail the vessel and transmit a warning that research and fishing in U.S. EEZ waters by foreign flag vessels is not permitted.\(^5\)

Upon the Cutter’s approach to the flotilla, the armed foreign flag vessel sends a warning message to the USCG Cutter to not continue the approach to the vessel.

Polar Security Cutter attempts to communicate with the flotilla via standard marine radio protocols are ineffective, receiving only garbled and unintelligible transmissions from the flotilla.

Wishing to prevent escalation, the USCG Polar Security Cutter withdraws to a safe distance to monitor the flotilla, which following the incident repositions just outside of 200 nautical miles from shore, while maintaining a provocatively close proximity to the U.S. EEZ.

National command authorities are asking for options to ensure U.S. sovereign jurisdiction can be maintained over U.S. EEZ waters while avoiding escalation and loss of life if practical. Exercise participants should consider: What are feasible, suitable and acceptable measures to de-escalate what appears to be a provocative behavior by a non-Arctic nation, testing U.S. resolve near America’s EEZ. It is not clear if these measures are conducted in a coordinate manner or in isolation. Could these provocations be in response from friction between the U.S./U.S. Allies in another region outside of the Arctic? What should U.S. actions be if actions become more aggressive and threatening? What military measures could be taken to reduce the potential for conflict, yet respond with strength? What do U.S. Allies (in particular Canada who shares interest in the nearby Beaufort Sea recommend? 

Possible courses of action for overall response (as starting suggestions).

- COA 1: Recommend measures to de-escalate scenario, such as monitor flotilla, while U.S. seeks diplomatic actions to address grievances.
- COA 2: Recommend measures to enforce U.S. jurisdiction in accordance with UNCLOS (noting that U.S. is not a signature authority) to remind the national flotilla their violations of U.S. waters will not be tolerated. These measures may include show of presence flights by USAF tactical fighter aircraft or other measures to enforce U.S. sovereignty.

Range of needed decisions/actions (as starting suggestions).

- Conducting and continuing reconnaissance of location to verify vessels at fine scale.
- Requesting measures/means to characterize what is being placed in the water vs what

\(^5\) Since the routine establishment of EEZs (normally 200 nautical miles from national shorelines), as codified in the United Nations International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, foreign vessels are normally granted the right of transit and freedom of navigation as long as these vessels are not conducting items exclusively prohibited such as weapons testing, polluting, fishing, or conducting scientific research.
may be taken out of the water.

- Assessing if other vessels/aircraft from other non-friendly nations are converging in the operating area.
- Assessing if additional measures are being taken against U.S. and Allies in other regions/ mediums as a distraction.
- Strategic public messaging to competitor.

- Determining Command and Control and overall response measures. Establishing supported and supporting relationships for the crisis response.
- Determining suitable monitoring measures that reduce risk of escalation of COA 1 is selected.
- Determining suitable measures to enforce U.S. jurisdiction, that may involve some measures of escalation if COA 2 is selected.
- Determining engagement criteria if hostile action is encountered by U.S. and allied forces in the region.
- Assessing measures to protect national territorial waters and coast lines if escalation occurs.

1250-1300 AST/1450-1500 MST/1650-1700 EST

ASLS Practitioners and Tabletop exercise close

ALCOM Commander provides closing reflections for ASLS21, with thanks and appreciation for panel and tabletop participation.

**ASLS21 Exercise participant guidelines**

The following is provided to support exercise participation (and to facilitate exercise discussion). Overall, the exercise is intended to be a guided discussion to address the challenges associated with each scenario, consider a range of possible responses and actions, (oriented to an organization level inputs) and provide decision management support.

**Exercise video orientation**: Exercise guided by “Unified Command Center” video that is organized with an initial scenario and mid-point intervention for decision makers. ASLS21 Exercise moderators will queue the video and guide a sequence of discussions, per participating organizations following each video segment.

Videos will be posted at [https://arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org/EventHub_ASLS21](https://arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org/EventHub_ASLS21)

**Exercise decision support**: In addition to video, the exercise control group provides the following

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6 Input from USNORTHCOM J5 Deputy POLAD
7 Note: Video screen shot illustration provided in Exercise Annex.
via a corresponding decision management screen (leveraging Lucid Spark® software and sharing associated screen with exercise participants). Note: Please see the corresponding viewgraphs

1. Scenario in brief.
2. Possible courses of action.
3. Range of needed decisions.
4. Tracking of decisions made.

Exercise participation interventions/responses: Each video will provide an initial overview, pause for one round of sequenced remarks, then conclude, with a second round of sequenced remarks. Following the second round of sequenced remarks...there will be an open period of discussion, followed by a review of decisions made. In order for each planned exercise planned organization to ask questions and provide input, exercise moderator will query exercise participants (in accordance with the below organizational lineup) in roll call fashion and asked to consider including/organizing their input to include the following:

1. Request for information/clarification of scenario (as needed).
2. Capabilities the organization could provide to address the response.

Exercise participation sequencing. Exercise moderator will guide interactions and decisions from exercise participants with planned interventions from (and planned in sequence):

1. U.S. Geographic Unified Commands
   a. NORAD and USNORTHCOM:
      i. USNORTHCOM Commander/designated representative.
      ii. USNORTHCOM Participating Staff Directors/designated representatives.
      iii. NORAD Participating Staff Directors/designated representatives.
         1. CANR
         2. ANR
      iv. Commanders/representatives from Component Commands:
         1. ARNORTH
         2. AFNORTH

Note: Lucid Spark information will be via share screen by exercise control group and no additional software uploads will be needed. Illustration provided in Exercise Annex.
3. MARFORNORTH

4. Fleet Forces Command (via designated reps, 2nd and 3rd Fleet)

5. SOCNORTH
   v. ALCOM, ANR and 11 AF Commander

b. USEUCOM
   i. USEUCOM Deputy Commander/designated representative
   ii. USEUCOM Participating Staff Directors/designated representatives.
   iii. Commanders/representatives from Component Commands: USAFE

c. USINDOPACOM
   i. USINDOPACOM Participating Staff Directors/designated representatives
   ii. Commanders/representatives from Component Commands:
       1. PACAF
       2. USARAK

2. U.S. Coast Guard: HQ USCG, USCG Pacific Area, USCG District 17, USCG District 17 Sector Anchorage
   a. HQ USCG Deputy Commandant for Operations/designated representatives
   b. USCG Pacific Area Commander/designated representatives
   c. USCG District 17 Commander/designated representatives
   d. USCG District 17 Sector Anchorage

3. Canadian Allied military:
   a. CJOC/CJOC Joint Task Force (North) (JTFN) Commander/designated representatives.

4. U.S. DoD Service HQs: HQ USAF, HQ Dept of Army, OPNAV, HQ USMC and HQ USSF

5. U.S. National Guard: The Adjutant General/designated representative Alaska National Guard.

6. Other participants. Note: Non-military organizations role principally role played by exercise control group.
Conclusion

ASLS21 will improve participants’ understanding of the challenges in the complicated risk environment that describes the new circumpolar north. This will be accomplished via a series of thoughtful discussions and activities to gain insights for needed solutions to address and potentially reduce the associated defense and security risks. ASLS21 will continue the momentum started with AMS18 and advanced through ASLS19 and AAS19, setting the stage for the next Arctic Symposium later in 2021.

ASLS21 Exercise Annex

ASLS21 Exercise program is guided by the use of videos for each scenario that includes an initial orientation, with planned break for participation oriented and sequenced by organizations, followed by mid-point video with follow-on discussions.

Following the mid-point discussions, the Exercise moderators will make summary conclusions of challenges and shortfalls noted, recommendations and actions made associated with the scenario. The following are screen shots from one of these exercise videos to provide an orientation for participants:
Via screen share, Exercise control group will use “Lucid spark” software organized with 4 screens (1 orientation screen and 3 decision management screens). This orientation includes:

1. Scenario in brief
2. Possible courses of action.
3. Range of needed decisions.
4. Tracking of decisions made.

The draft depiction of this exercise decision management system is provided in the below graphic.

*Figure 6: ASLS21 Exercise Management Construct (Note, depicting all three moves)*